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Competing claims for legal protection based on religion and on sexual orientation 
have arisen fairly frequently in Canada in the past decade or so. The authors 
place such competitions into five categories based on the nature of who is making 
the claim and who is impacted, the site of the competition, and the extent to which 
the usual legal and constitutional norms applicable are affected. Three of the 
five categories identified involve a claim that a religion operate in some form in 
the public area so as to impinge on the usual protection of equality on the basis 
of sexual orientation. The authors examine the basis of claims for such religion-
based exceptionalism and argue that acceptance of the religion claim in these 
three public-area categories would involve unjustifiable curtailment of citizenship 
for queer people and could undermine the equality gains that have been made 
by this group.
Des revendications concurrentes pour la protection juridique fondées sur la religion 
et l’orientation sexuelle ont été invoquées avec une fréquence relative au Canada 
pendant la dernière décennie. Les auteurs divisent ces revendications en cinq 
catégories, en fonction de la personne qui présente la revendication et de celle 
qui en subit les effets, du lieu où elle est présentée et de la mesure dans laquelle 
les normes juridiques usuelles et constitutionnelles applicables sont touchées. 
Pour trois des cinq catégories ainsi définies, on relève un argument voulant 
qu’une religion soit activement pratiquée d’une façon ou d’une autre en public, 
de façon à empiéter sur la protection habituelle d’égalité fondée sur l’orientation 
sexuelle. Les auteurs examinent le fondement des prétentions d’exceptionnalisme 
fondé sur la religion et prétendent que la revendication religieuse dans les trois 
catégories du domaine public entraînerait un empiétement injustifiable sur la 
citoyenneté des homosexuels et pourrait faire reculer les gains enregistrés par 
ces derniers en matière d’égalité.
* Bruce MacDougall, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
** Donn Short, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba.
134 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Introduction
I. Competition between religion and sexual orientation claims
II. Competition scenarios
III. Arguments for religious exceptionalism
Conclusion
Introduction
In recent years and in differing contexts, religion-based claims have been 
asserted that, if accepted, would justify the ability of individuals and groups 
asserting such claims to deny service, employment or even recognition to 
queer people and groups.1 In this paper we examine the emergence of this 
competition between religion and sexual orientation claims. The paper has 
two main parts. In the first part, we propose a five-fold categorization of 
the contexts in which such claims might in practice arise, we suggest that 
in three of these categories or scenarios an acceptance of the religion claim 
necessarily means impingement on the constitutional or statutory rights 
guaranteeing equality on the basis of sexual orientation and a consequent 
denial of full citizenship to queer individuals. Here, in these three 
categories, such an impingement results from the use of a religious norm 
as the determinant for deciding when a public service will be provided 
(or denied). In the second part of the paper, we examine the arguments 
that might be made justifying such impingement in these three scenarios 
and argue that none of the arguments ought to be accepted. The religion 
arguments are unlike many other arguments for equality and inclusion in 
that they call for the right to deny equal, inclusive treatment for queer 
people in certain contexts where services are being offered to, or even on 
behalf of, the public. We argue that a concession to the religion arguments 
in these scenarios, all outside the context of actual religious worship and 
observance, would set a precedent whereby any person could, on the basis 
of a genuinely-held belief, religious or otherwise, demand an exception to 
non-discrimination norms in the provision of services to the public.
1. In this paper, the term “queer” is used to include all non-heterosexual sexualities. The terms “gay 
men and lesbians,” “GLBT” and “homosexual” are used where the context relates to those specific 
queer sexualities.
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I. Competition between religion and sexual orientation claims
Equality protection on the basis of sexual orientation—whether the 
protection is constitutional or “merely” statutory—was bound to generate 
a contentious response from those asserting certain claims based on 
religion. Arguments against equality claims for lesbians and gay men are 
almost exclusively religious in nature. As is examined in the following 
part of this paper, certain issues have emerged that are emblematic of 
the competition between sexual orientation and equality claims. Perhaps 
the most prominent of such issues are same-sex marriage, hiring policies 
at denominational facilities offering services to the public, and use of 
or reference to religious standards to set public policy or offer public 
services—most notably in the educational context and with respect to 
providing services to people with exceptional needs.
The religious character of the opposition to claims of equality based 
on sexual orientation is exemplified in the same-sex civil marriage 
context. Here the specific issue has been how, if at all, the provinces would 
accommodate the views of those marriage commissioners who objected to 
performing same-sex marriage. While theoretically such objections might 
be based on non-religious grounds, we know of no instance in which 
the objection is not religiously rooted. Furthermore, in a Saskatchewan 
human rights case involving an action against a marriage commissioner 
who refused to conduct a same-sex marriage ceremony, the marriage 
commissioner admitted that he had no objection to marrying opposite-
sex couples whose conduct was contrary to his religious beliefs—it was 
with respect only to same-sex couples that he drew the line.2 The religious 
basis of such objection is even written into s. 3.1 of the Civil Marriage Act 
which states as follows:
[n]o person … shall be … subject to any obligation or sanction … solely 
by reason of their exercise, in respect of marriage between persons of the 
same sex, of the freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed under 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the expression of their 
beliefs in respect of marriage as the union of a man and woman to the 
exclusion of all others based on that guaranteed freedom.3
The Act clearly purports to facilitate only objections to same-sex marriage. 
We are not aware of any refusal that was not based on religious views. 
Furthermore, so far as we are aware, no marriage commissioner in any 
jurisdiction has been permitted to refuse to solemnize a marriage on the 
2. Nichols v MJ, 2009 SKQB 299, 339 Sask R 35 at paras 13, 53-54.
3. Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c 33.
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basis of the personal characteristics of those seeking marriage except on 
the basis that the couple was of the same sex. Nor has there yet been any 
argument that religious exemptions should be available for other protected 
grounds enumerated or read into s. 15 of the Charter,4 such personal 
characteristics as race, ethnicity, national origin, age and so on—although 
the Prince Edward Island Marriage Act does provide a statutory basis to 
commissioners to refuse to solemnize a marriage that is not “in accordance 
with that person’s religious beliefs.”5 Saskatchewan proposed similarly-
worded legislation.6   
 Despite religious arguments of discrimination or even persecution, 
religious organisations are on the whole privileged.7 The contrast 
with sexual minorities like gays and lesbians is profoundly striking. 
Religions frequently have their own educational and social institutions 
and widespread cultural vindication. Religious individuals—including 
especially children—have ready-made support systems in the family 
and the community. By contrast, queer youth often have no family or 
community support for their sexuality and are sometimes “thrown away” by 
their families.8 Religion is generally protected and even privileged around 
the world and is the subject of international treaties. Sexual orientation, by 
contrast, has very limited international protection.9
The nature of the claims recently made in Canada by religions and 
by sexual minorities which is the subject of more specific discussion later 
in this paper, is instructive. Sexual orientation claims tend to be claims 
either for benefits or access that others have, or actions seeking an end 
4. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
5. Marriage Act, RSPEI 1988, c M-3, s 11.1. New Brunswick proposed similar legislation: Bill 76, 
An Act to Amend the Marriage Act, 2nd Sess, 55th Leg, New Brunswick, 2005, cl 12.1.
6. Bill (draft), An Act to amend the Marriage Act, 1995, Saskatchewan, 2009. This bill was held 
to be unconstitutional in Reference re Saskatchewan (Marriage Act, Marriage Commissioners), 2011 
SKCA 3, 327 DLR (4th) 669, a decision released after the writing of this article which, therefore, does 
not consider it. 
7. An engagement with more general legal issues relating to religion in Canada is found in the 
articles in Richard Moon, ed, Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) 
[Moon, ed, Religious Pluralism]. Among other valuable contributions, those articles document most 
of the academic literature available on legal-religion issues in Canada. While the contributions in 
that book take different approaches, on the whole the authors are sympathetic to the idea of religious 
exceptionalism in Canada and for a special place being reserved for the protection of religious belief 
as opposed to non-religious belief.
8. See Nicholas Ray, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth: An Epidemic of 
Homelessness (New York: National Gay & Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute and the National 
Coalition for the Homeless: 2006). 
9. Patrick Worsnip, “UN divided over gay rights declaration” Reuters (10 December 2008), 
online: Reuters <http://www.reuters.com>. According to proponents of the French-Dutch statement, 
homosexuality is illegal in seventy-seven countries and punishable by death in seven of those.
Religion-based Claims for Impinging on Queer Citizenship 137
to discrimination; that is, the claims seek the same treatment received 
by others. Conversely, religion-based claims (though often presented 
as inclusion claims) usually seek some sort of exceptionalism—so that 
the religious person or group does not have to abide by the same norms 
by which others must abide. They are often claims to deny inclusion 
or services or employment to individuals who have constitutional and 
statutory rights guaranteeing such inclusion—often gays and lesbians and 
other queers.
Religion-based claims are put forward primarily on the basis that 
a particular kind of belief (religious) carries with it an entitlement to 
particular treatment that other types of belief (political, philosophical, or 
mere whimsy) do not. Richard Moon writes that “even when the state 
is pursuing an otherwise legitimate public purpose...it may be required 
to compromise this purpose and accommodate incompatible religious 
practices. There is no similar state obligation to accommodate non-
religious beliefs and practices.”10 Religious belief is “special.”11 Religious 
belief, it would seem to follow, warrants public manifestation to an extent 
that includes impinging the rights of others in a way that a non-religious 
belief could not be manifested. The reason for this privileging of religious 
belief is questionable. If I have racist beliefs and wish not to have to serve 
members of the public who are from a racial minority, why should the 
fact that my belief is grounded in “religion,” as opposed to non-religious 
conviction, matter? In terms of the legislation on same-sex marriage in 
PEI, why should my belief that I ought not to marry divorced people have 
to be religious in nature in order to be permitted to refuse to serve such 
members of the public?
II. Competition scenarios
Cases in which there might be competition between a claim based on 
religious grounds and a claim put forward on the basis of sexual orientation 
can be divided into four scenarios—meaning four factual contexts in 
which the competition might in practice arise. There is also a fifth and 
related scenario where there is not truly such a competition between the 
claims. These scenarios are:
first: exemption from usual norms granted to a religious institution 
performing a public function or providing a service to the public;
second: translation of religious views and dogma into the public arena;
10. Richard Moon, “Introduction: Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada” in Moon, ed, Religious 
Pluralism, supra note 7 at 15.
11. Ibid.
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third: exemption from usual norms for a religious individual performing 
a public function or providing a service to the public;
fourth: interjection of constitutional norms into religious observances or 
doctrine; and
fifth: accommodation of religious practices in a work environment not 
affecting constitutional protections of others.
The first three scenarios involve a religious element, particularly 
a religious norm or view, being injected into the public arena in some 
form. They are ordered (from first to third) in terms of the scope of the 
involvement. So in the first scenario, the service provided by a religious 
institution will generally have a large or general impact while, in the third 
scenario, the service provided by a specific religious individual will have 
a more specific impact. The first three scenarios are to a certain extent 
blurred or difficult to differentiate in some situations, but that is not terribly 
important, we argue that they ought all to be dealt with in the same manner. 
We argue that the first three scenarios here should be resolved without 
impingement upon the constitutional and statutory rights protections of 
the public, particularly queer people. Such a resolution would entail an 
unacceptable expansion of protection for religion and particularly religious 
values into spheres and contexts that are not at the core of religion but are 
in fact part of the public sphere where the rights of others ought not to 
be affected by religious beliefs those others do not hold. In the fourth 
scenario, by contrast, the public norms are being injected into the religious 
arena. In the fifth scenario (as in the first three scenarios) the religious 
element is being injected into the public arena but in a way that does not 
diminish the entitlements of others. In this part of the paper we elaborate 
further on these five scenarios and how the first three differ from the other 
two. In the next part of the paper we discuss the arguments that are used to 
justify a resolution favouring the religious claim in a context falling within 
the first three scenarios.
The first scenario relates to claims pertaining to a religious institution 
in which that religious institution involves itself in the provision of public 
services or facilities or accepts public money to operate a facility.12 In 
this situation, what can arise is a claim to exclude a queer person from 
the institution in terms of employment or use. Or, the institution insists 
on “anti-homosexual norms” imposed on those who make use of the 
12. See Alvin J Esau, “‘Islands of Exclusivity’: Religious Organizations and Employment 
Discrimination” (2000), 33 UBC L Rev 719.
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institution. There are several cases in this scenario involving education,13 
social or other facilities,14 and social services.15
It is not surprising in a country like Canada, where religious 
organisations commonly provide public services, that there are a number of 
examples of the first scenario. One such case is Heintz v. Christian Horizons, 
where a lesbian “of deep Christian faith” resigned her employment with 
Christian Horizons, an evangelical Christian group that operated homes 
for the developmentally challenged, when her lesbianism and her lesbian 
relationship was revealed.16 If she had not resigned, her employment would 
have been terminated. When she started work with Christian Horizons 
she signed a “Lifestyle and Morality Statement” agreeing to refrain from 
“inappropriate behaviour” which included “homosexual relationships.” 
Such relationships were contrary to the religious teaching of Christian 
Horizons.
The case was decided in the context of the Ontario Human Rights Code 
which guarantees equal treatment with respect to employment without 
discrimination because of sexual orientation.17 The Ontario Code also 
makes clear, however, that equal treatment with respect to employment 
is not infringed where “a religious ... institution or organization that is 
primarily engaged in serving the interests of persons identified by their 
race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, creed, sex, age, marital 
status or disability employs only, or gives preference in employment to, 
persons similarly identified if the qualification is a reasonable and bona 
fide qualification because of the nature of the employment.”18 In this case, 
the services provided by Christian Horizons were not provided primarily 
for its co-religionists, but for the developmentally challenged—and so 
it did not meet the requirements for the exemption for discrimination in 
employment. The Tribunal held, however, that even if Christian Horizons 
had served mainly its co-religionists, compliance with the “Lifestyle and 
Morality Statement” was not “a reasonable and bona fide qualification 
because of the nature of the employment.”19 Heintz was a support worker 
13. See Hall (Litigation guardian of) v Powers (2002), 59 OR (3d) 423, 213 DLR (4th) 308 (Sup 
Ct J) [Hall] (high school context); Trinity Western University v British Columbia College of Teachers, 
2001 SCC 31, [2001] 1 SCR 772 [TWU] (university context).
14. See Smith v Knights of Columbus, 2005 BCHRTD 544, [2005] BCHRTD no 544 (use of 
community hall);  L’Association ADGQ v Catholic School Commission of Montreal (1979), 112 DLR 
(3d) 230 (Qc Sup Ct) (use of school).
15. See Heintz v Christian Horizons, 2008 HRTO 22, [2008] OHRTD no 21 [Heintz].
16. Ibid at paras 27-28.
17. Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H-19 at s 5(1) [Ontario Code].
18. Ibid at s 24(1)(a). The Tribunal noted that the language of the special employment exceptions in 
human rights legislation varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
19. Heintz, supra note 15 at para 6.
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with the residents and not a religious adviser or performing a related 
religious function as part of her job.  
If the activities of the institution are more centrally involved in instilling 
the tenets of the faith, the outcome might be different, but perhaps only in 
the specific contexts where those tenets are actually being instilled. The 
case of Hall illustrates the education context.20 There, a student, Marc 
Hall, attending a Roman Catholic school in Ontario, wanted to take his 
boyfriend as his date to his high school prom. The principal and the school 
board denied Hall permission to attend the prom with his boyfriend. The 
principal reasoned that “interaction at the Prom between romantic partners 
is a form of sexual activity and that, if permission were granted to Mr. Hall 
to attend the prom with his boyfriend as a same sex couple, this would be 
seen both as an endorsement and condonation of conduct which is contrary 
to Catholic church teachings.”21 R. MacKinnon J. granted an injunction 
restraining the defendants from preventing Hall’s attendance at the prom 
with his boyfriend. The Court decided that the prom was not a function 
with primarily religious significance and so the protection of religion was 
not of primary importance. The Court kept the impingement on rights 
on the basis of a religion claim to as narrow a basis as possible. Hall’s 
request to bring a same-sex date to the prom did not prejudicially impact 
the central denominational nature of the school. Furthermore, applying the 
standard set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Bill 30, 
An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ontario),22 the specific right being 
asserted by the Catholic School Board—namely, the right to regulate 
extra-curricular activities including the school prom—was not within their 
protected rights at the time of Confederation and could not, therefore, be 
claimed by the school or the school board as a constitutionally guaranteed 
right in 2002.23 
The injection of religious norms into public or civil life can occur when 
functions normally available from the government are “privatised”—that 
is, obtainable by the public from religious organisations or other groups. 
It is worth noting that for lack of anywhere near the equivalent resources, 
there is little or no engagement in the other direction—a queer rights group 
20. Supra note 13 at para 4. See Bruce MacDougall, “The Separation of Church and Date: 
Destabilizing Traditional Religion-Based Legal Norms on Sexuality” (2003) 36:1 UBC L  Rev 1; 
David Schneiderman, “Associational Rights, Religion, and the Charter”, in Moon, ed, Religious 
Pluralism, supra note 7.
21. Supra note 13 at para 4. 
22. Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ontario), [1987] 1 SCR 1148, 40 DLR 
(4th) 18.
23. Since Hall was dealing with the issue of whether or not the court should grant an injunction, the 
full adjudication of these issues awaits for another day.
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will rarely if ever be in a position of offering services to those outside 
the membership of the group. In the marriage context, some argue that 
governments should entirely “get out of the business” of conducting 
marriages—leaving marriages to be conducted only by officials of religious 
groups. Presumably, then, couples that sought an official union, who could 
not get or did not want a religious ceremony, would have to settle for some 
make-do civil union. Heintz is an example of the problems that can arise 
when the provision of these types of services is transferred to such interest 
groups. Care has to be taken that the workplace is not made hostile to 
queer individuals. In Heintz, the Tribunal found that Christian Horizons 
had allowed a discriminatory environment to pervade the workplace.24 It 
was wrong for the employer to offer to provide a “restoration” cure for 
Heintz’s homosexuality and to allow rumours and discriminatory attitudes 
to poison the workplace for her. The adjudicator, Michael Gottheil, said: 
“Its policy, based on the belief that homosexuality was unnatural and 
immoral, engendered fear, ignorance, hatred and suspicion. It sent the 
message to employees that gays and lesbians were not equal members 
of the workplace community.”25 When religious (or other) organisations 
become active in civil life beyond the confines of their own membership, 
it can be argued that such involvement is quasi-governmental in nature 
and ought therefore to be subject to the same constraints that would be 
imposed on a government engaged in such an operation. 
The second type of case involves religion-based claims asserted by an 
individual or group to direct the policy of a public service in some way 
that reflects the religious beliefs of that individual or group. Such policy 
might be inimical to the equality interests of queer people. This category 
is different from the first category in that the claim in the first category 
relates to religious institutions, whereas the context of the cases in the 
second category relates to a public institution or service. In this second 
category are cases involving the setting of a public education agenda,26 
limitations on access by gay groups to public institutions, and declaration 
of Pride Days by public authorities.27
24. Supra note 15 at para 256.
25. Ibid.
26. Chamberlain v Surrey School District No 36, 2002 SCC 86, [2002] 4 SCR 710 [Chamberlain].
27. See Oliver v Hamilton (City), [1995] OHRBID no 56, 24 CHRR D/298 (Ont Bd Inq); Hudler 
v London (City), [1997] OHRBID no 23, 31 CHRR D/500 (Ont Bd Inq),  Hill v Woodside, 1998 
CarswellNB 562, 33 CHRR D/349 (NB Bd Inq); Okanagan Rainbow Coalition v City of Kelowna, 
2000 BCHRT 21, [2000] BCHRTD no 21; Rainbow Committee of Terrace v Terrace (City), 2002 
BCHRT 26, [2002] BCHRTD no 26.
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This scenario is exemplified by Chamberlain, where a resolution, 
referred to as the “Three Books Resolution”, was passed by the Board of 
Trustees of the Surrey School District on 24 April 1997, indicating that 
the Board did not approve the use of three books depicting children with 
same-sex parents as “Recommended Learning Resources.”28 The British 
Columbia School Act states:
76(1) All schools must be conducted on strictly secular and non-sectarian 
principles.
(2) The highest morality must be inculcated, but no religion, dogma or 
creed is to be taught in a school or Provincial school.29
There was evidence at the trial level as to the religious motivation of those 
who did not want materials sympathetic to homosexuality in the schools. 
Writing for the majority, McLachlin C.J. said: “The School Act’s emphasis 
on secularism reflects the fact that Canada is a diverse and multicultural 
society, bound together by the values of accommodation, tolerance and 
respect for diversity.”30 With respect to the particular context of the case, 
she said: “[The Board] cannot prefer the religious views of some people 
in its districts to the views of other segments of the community. Nor can it 
appeal to views that deny the equal validity of the lawful lifestyles of some 
in the school community.”31
The third category involves claims by a religious individual seeking 
to import religious norms into that person’s performance of a public 
office, public function or public service. The basis of the claim is that 
the religious belief and performance are inseparable. The effect of these 
claims—if they were successful—would be to allow discrimination in a 
way that would be impermissible for the government itself. This set of 
cases differs from the second group in that the claimant does not seek to 
lay down general policy for the public institution or service, but seeks to 
differentiate the claimant’s role within the institution or service on the 
basis of a religious claim. Here we find the cases involving those who wish 
to refuse to officiate at same-sex civil marriages,32 those who wish not to 
28. Chamberlain, supra note 26 at para 50.
29. School Act, RSBC 1996, c 412.
30. Supra note 26 at para 21.
31. Ibid at para 25. The use by McLachlin CJ of the term “lawful lifestyles of some” is somewhat 
strange. This term has been used to diminish homosexual sexual orientation as a sort of caprice, on par 
with a choice of décor or degree of house clutter.
32. Supra note 2 and infra note 33. See Lorraine Lafferty, “Religion, Sexual Orientation and the 
State: Can Public Officials Refuse to Perform Same-Sex Marriage?” (2006), 28 Can Bar Rev 287.
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teach or offer services relating to sexual orientation in schools,33 those who 
wish to engage in homophobic expression and be identified as holding the 
public position,34 and businesses who wish to refuse to serve lesbian and 
gay clients.35
Typifying this third group are the marriage commissioner cases. 
In several jurisdictions marriage commissioners have been obligated 
to state their willingness to marry all couples seeking marriage; some 
commissioners were required to resign because of their refusal to do so. 
There have been at least two sets of complaints commenced by affected 
marriage commissioners in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, with all of the 
initial decisions going against the marriage commissioners.36 Similarly, 
a complaint was filed by an individual who was denied a same-sex 
marriage ceremony by a marriage commissioner in Saskatchewan. The 
Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal upheld the complaint and rejected 
the marriage commissioner’s arguments that he ought to be able to decide 
when to provide the services based on his own religious criteria.37 This 
decision was upheld by the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench. It 
agreed that the commissioner had discriminated and that an accommodation 
of his religious beliefs was not required.38 A marriage commissioner was, 
the Court held, a “governmental entity” because he or she implements 
a specific government scheme.  As such, the marriage commissioner is 
“empowered to act only in accordance with” the relevant law, in this case 
that governing marriages.39 The Court held that when acting as a marriage 
commissioner, a person’s “freedom of religion ought to be limited to 
exclude discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”40 The Court 
concluded that the freedom to refuse to perform a ceremony for religious 
reasons applied only to religious officials performing religious marriages. 
33. Chiang v Vancouver Board of Education, 2009 BCHRT 319, [2009] BCHRTD no 319 
[Chiang].
34. Kempling v British Columbia College of Teachers, 2004 BCSC 133, 27 BCLR (4th) 139 
[Kempling].
35. Brockie v Ontario (Human Rights Commission) (2002), 222 DLR (4th) 174 (Ont Sup Ct) 
[Brockie].
36. These cases are discussed in Geoffrey Trotter, “The Right to Decline Performance of Same-
Sex Civil Marriages: The Duty to Accommodate Public Servants - A Response to Professor Bruce 
MacDougall” (2007), 70:1 Sask L Rev 365 at 390-91. See also Manitoba: Kisilowsky, Man Human 
Rights Comm File No 04 EN 462. Three cases before the Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal 
were, until recently, found at: Nichols: <http://www.saskhrt.ca/forms/index/Descisions/251006.htm>; 
Bjerland: <http://www.saskhrt.ca/forms/index/Descisions/251006a.htm>; Goertzen: <http://www.
saskhrt.ca/forms/index/Descisions/251006b.htm>. 
37. Supra note 2.
38. Ibid at para 77.
39. Ibid at para 53.
40. Ibid at para 73.
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A third scenario case involving a school context is illustrated by 
Chiang.41 In Chiang a teacher-librarian at a public secondary school 
filed a complaint that she was discriminated against in relation to her 
employment on the basis of religion, contrary to s. 13 of the Code. She 
had allegedly declined to put up rainbow stickers in her schoolrooms to 
show support for GLBT students and had been reluctant to catalogue 
GLBT-related books in the library. She claimed that not putting up the 
stickers when others had done so would identify her as not supportive of 
GLBT students—perhaps as a result of her religious beliefs. She had not 
processed GLBT books donated to the library and claimed that questions 
about her delay constituted discrimination against her on the basis of her 
religion. The Tribunal noted that while the public school system must 
ensure that it provides a learning environment free from discrimination, “it 
must also respect the religious freedom of students and teachers alike.”42 
Tribunal Member Lindsay Lyster stated that “[p]ublic school teachers are 
free to hold the religious beliefs of their choice. Their conduct, however, 
is a legitimate area of concern for their employers, and must be consistent 
with the core values of non-discrimination and tolerance.”43 Chiang was 
apparently a lone teacher wishing to opt out of policies and practices 
designed to foster inclusion for queer people, in particular queer youth. In 
many geographical areas, of course, she would be among a significant or 
even dominant group of personnel with such religious views.
Most of the situations included in the third scenario involve a place of 
work in a direct way. Some courts have even extended equality protection 
against religion-based claims of public servants in connection with 
activities outside the workplace, when the service position was implicated 
in those outside activities. In Kempling, the Court considered the case of 
a teacher/guidance counsellor in a public school who wrote, qua teacher/
counsellor, virulent homophobic letters in a local newspaper.44 The College 
of Teachers disciplined him. The Court of Appeal held that there had been 
a justifiable infringement of the claimant’s expressive rights. Lowry J.A. 
wrote:
In his writings, Mr. Kempling made clear that his discriminatory beliefs 
would inform his actions as a teacher and counsellor. His writings 
therefore, in themselves, undermine access to a discrimination-free 
education environment. Evidence that particular students no longer felt 
welcome within the school system, or that homosexual students refused 
41. Chiang, supra note 33.
42. Ibid at para 22. 
43. Ibid at para 117.
44. Kempling, supra note 34 at para 2.
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to go to Mr. Kempling for counselling, is not required to establish that 
harm has been caused. Mr. Kempling’s statements, even in the absence 
of any further actions, present an obstacle for homosexual students in 
accessing a discrimination-free education environment. These statements 
are therefore inherently harmful, not only because they deny access, but 
because in doing so they have damaged the integrity of the school system 
as a whole.45
The next part of this paper addresses the claims made by a religious 
person or institution in these three categories just discussed. While these 
three factual scenarios may seem quite different, they have in common a 
claim to be permitted to inject (discriminatory) religious views and values 
into the public context. They have in common an impingement on the 
constitutional rights of the members of some group (i.e. queer people) if 
the claims based on religion succeed or are facilitated. It will be argued in 
the next part of the paper that a claim for religious exceptionalism in these 
three scenarios ought ordinarily to be rejected if it means—as it normally 
will—a denial or infringement of a claim for inclusion based on sexual 
orientation equality. 
Before we turn to these arguments made for religious exceptionalism, 
it is worth noting that there are two other scenarios where there can be 
a competition between religion claims and sexual orientation claims. 
These are what we call the fourth and fifth scenarios. Here, the injection 
of religious values into the public context is either non-existent or so slight 
that the religion claim should prevail over any sexual orientation claim.
The fourth possible scenario contains somewhat improbable situations. 
One situation would involve a queer person’s seeking to have equality 
norms imposed on a religious institution or individual in the religious 
operations of the institution or religious worship of the individual himself 
or herself. A clear example would be a claim that the law required a church 
to accept homosexual clergy. Such a claim has never actually been made 
in Canada, so far as we know.46  Fears that accepting the sexual orientation 
equality claims in the first three scenarios discussed here is bound to result in 
45. Kempling, supra note 34 at para 79. The Court of Appeal did not consider s 2(a) Charter
arguments dealing with freedom of religion.
46. There have been a few claims, it is true, where courts have been asked to enter ecclesiatical/
theological debates where there is a dispute within the organisation itself or between its members: see 
e.g. Bruker v Markovitz, 2007 SCC 54, [2007] 3 SCR 607. See also Alvin Esau, “Living by Different 
Law: Legal Pluralism, Freedom of Religion, and Illiberal Religious Groups”, in Moon, ed, Religious
Pluralism, supra note 7. Unlike us, Esau does not clearly differentiate situations where courts are 
asked to adjudicate on theological matters and situations where courts are asked to adjudicate on 
claims of a religion (or a religious person) to discriminate on religious bases in the provision of non-
religious facilities and services.
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interference with religious worship are alarmist. Such alarmism, however, 
is arguably the reason for the inclusion of s. 3.1 of the Civil Marriage Act, 
mentioned earlier. There never was a claim that religious institutions ought 
to be compelled to conduct same-sex marriages in contravention of their 
own dogma, yet this late-added section in the statute appears designed to 
address the making of such a claim.
A variation on the fourth scenario is a religion-based claim advanced 
on the grounds that it is the religious person’s whole life (including any 
time spent performing a public function or offering a service to the public) 
that comprises that claimant’s religious observance or worship. In such a 
way, a situation that would otherwise be fitted into one of the first three 
scenarios (the public context) would be slotted into this fourth scenario 
(the private religious context). It is true that a particular religious view 
may not support a compartmentalisation between a person’s religious 
life and a person’s public/work life.47 This would move many scenarios 
into this fourth category. This characterization of a person’s entire day-
to-day existence as religious observance that somehow ought to be 
fully accommodated evidently cannot be accepted as the basis for legal 
entitlement. In any event, such beliefs cannot be tested or proven.48 A court 
ought to reject outright a claim of a person that all his or her activities 
of any sort—including employment dealing with the public—is part of a 
central religious observance.
What we call the fifth scenario is anomalous by comparison with the 
other four because it does not actually present a competition between a 
religion and a sexual orientation claim. In this scenario, there is a claim for 
the reasonable accommodation of a religious person on the job, in a way that 
does not entail the denial of service to, or access for, a member of the public 
on the basis of a protected personal characteristic. This is simply another 
way of stating what Bruce Ryder asserts to be the “core idea” that “society 
must accommodate individuals’ religious freedom to hold and express 
religious beliefs and engage in religious practices unless doing so would 
interfere with the rights of others or with compelling social interests.”49 
Accordingly, non-availability to work on a religious feast day, a religious 
47. See Carl F Stychin, “Faith in the Future: Sexuality, Religion and the Public Sphere” (2009) 29:4 
Oxford J Legal Stud 729 at 732.
48. The issue of the increasingly difficult complexity in (legally) defining what is and is not religion/
religious is discussed in Lori G Beaman, “Defining Religion: The Promise and the Peril of Legal 
Interpretation”, in Moon, ed, Religious Pluralism, supra note 7. See also c 9 of that same work: 
Richard Moon, “Government Support for Religious Practice”.
49. Bruce Ryder, “The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship”, in Moon, ed, Religious 
Pluralism, supra note 7 at 87 [emphasis added].
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requirement to wear certain types of clothing50 or to observe prayer at 
particular times of the day, and so on are generally reasonable bases for 
religious accommodation.51 These types of accommodation are inclusive 
accommodation; they have the effect of integrating as many individuals as 
possible into the social and economic fabric and do no harm other persons. 
Even if this accommodation makes the religious belief of the person clear 
to others (whether fellow employees or members of the public), and even 
if this entails knowledge of the presumptive discriminatory beliefs held by 
that person, there is no actual or serious infringement on the rights of other 
people. The religion-based claims should surely succeed in this context. 
Therefore, we do not deal with this scenario further in the next part of the 
paper.
III. Arguments for religious exceptionalism
There are a number of arguments that can be made supporting the religion-
based position in the competitions represented in the first three scenarios 
above. These arguments have been made in support of claims grounded 
in religious belief seeking exemption from performing same-sex civil 
marriages,52  but they can be extended to other circumstances where 
religion and sexual orientation claims also compete. The arguments are 
as follows:
(a) refusal to allow an exception for a religious person from the 
application of the usual equality norms means public servants 
or those who serve the public are required to personally endorse 
government policies that conflict with their religious values;
(b) refusal to allow an exception for a religious person from the 
application of the usual equality norms amounts to coercion by the 
state at the behest of “powerful” groups;
(c) refusal to allow an exception for a religious person from the 
application of the usual equality norms fails to accommodate 
religious views held in good faith, namely that homosexuality or 
homosexual behaviour, or both, are immoral;
50. See Peel Board of Education v Ontario Human Rights Commission (1991), 3 OR (3d) 531, 80 
DLR (4th) 475; and Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 
SCR 256. 
51. Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536, [1985] SCJ no 74; 
Pannu v Prestige Cab Ltd (1986), 8 CHRR D/3709 (Alta Bd Inq); Singh v Workmen’s Compensation 
Board Hospital (1981), 2 CHRR D/459 (Ont Bd Inq); Multani, supra note 50; Peel Board of Education, 
supra note 50; and c.f. Trotter, supra note 36.
52. See Trotter, supra note 36.
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(d) allowing an exception for a religious person from the application 
of the usual equality norms would not present an undue burden on 
queer people; and
(e) the number of people affected by allowing an exception for a 
religious person from the application of the usual equality norms 
would be small.
We consider each of these in turn.
(a) Refusal to allow an exception for a religious person from the 
application of the usual equality norms means public servants 
or those who serve the public are required to personally endorse 
government policies that conflict with their religious values
This argument is based on the idea that where beliefs are strongly held 
by public servants or those who offer services to the public, they ought 
not to be required to perform actions that conflict with, or in some cases 
even contradict, those views and values. Such required performance 
is tantamount, the argument goes, to a governmental requirement of 
expression by the individual himself or herself—a requirement that would 
always be improper, but particularly inappropriate when the content of 
the government-mandated expression is directly contrary to the religious 
beliefs the person actually holds. This is perhaps the strongest argument 
against refusing to allow an exception for a religious person from the 
application of the usual equality norms.53
The problem with this argument is that it is based on the idea that 
public servants or those who serve the public are somehow said to be 
endorsing government “policy” when they carry out their duties on behalf 
of the government or offer their services to the public. Trotter says that it 
is an “illiberal notion that the persons performing public functions must 
leave their conscientiously held beliefs at home and church, and personally 
embrace all state policy when they are at work.”54 This quite obviously is 
not the case. Public servants of all sorts and those who serve the public are 
daily required to carry out policies that they may find highly distasteful 
for religious or other reasons. They are also required to serve those who 
stand for or represent values that may be contrary to their particular 
religious values. For example, court clerks are required to process divorce 
53. Richard Moon expresses this type of concern differently: “The exclusion of religious values 
from public decision making may limit the individual’s participation in public discourse and decision 
making and marginalize religious practice and association.” Moon, “Introduction”, supra note 10 at 
3.
54. Trotter, supra note 36 at 366.
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applications though their religion might oppose divorce. Welfare officers 
are required to deny benefits to applicants though they may strongly object 
to the policy that denies the benefit. Immigration officers are required to 
process the files of couples of multiple ethnicities, though they might hold 
strong views against miscegenation for religious or other reasons. Being 
required to provide services to everybody does not mean that the person 
providing the service is somehow being required to endorse state policy. 
In the civil service context, there may be government positions that 
require public servants to carry out various types of activities. Focussing 
on some of these activities, rather than others, might allow an employee to 
avoid tasks that are objectionable for religious or other reasons. However, 
a marriage commissioner, for example, is hired to do just one thing—
perform marriages. The Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, in one 
of the marriage commissioner cases, held that a marriage commissioner 
appointed to perform civil marriage ceremonies devoid of any religious 
content can be characterized as part of “government” for constitutional 
purposes.55 It is not reasonable in this context to permit such public 
servants to pick and choose whom to serve based on their own views – any 
more than it would be permissible for an immigration officer to wave aside 
a person of a particular ethnic background to stand in a different queue 
because he or she does not serve people of that background or ethnicity.
Care has to be taken, we argue, to ensure that an employee not be 
permitted at his or her own discretion to infuse religious significance into 
government services or the provision of services to the public. There is 
no shortage of religion-based services in Canada. Religious education is 
permitted. There is a range of religious social services available. Religious 
marriages are in almost all cases fully recognized by the state. It might be 
noted that in Nichols, the commissioner who wished to refuse to conduct 
same-sex civil marriage acknowledged that he could have been appointed 
to conduct marriages only within his religious institution, but he “did not 
want to so restrict himself.”56 The marriage commissioner is, however, 
hired to conduct non-religious ceremonies. Public services offered outside 
the context of the central spiritual rites or ministry of a religion or a religious 
official ought not to be provided (or denied) on a sectarian basis.
Quite different is the context of an accommodation in employment 
made for religious reasons, where the rights of members of the public 
are not directly and personally impinged. These contexts are those 
included in the fifth scenario discussion in the previous part of the paper. 
55. Supra note 2 at para 52.
56. Ibid at para 10.
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Employees may be allowed certain days or times off for religious reasons. 
They may be allowed certain accommodations related to dress connected 
to religious views. A government meat inspector, for example, might be 
permitted to avoid pork inspections because of a religious notion that 
such meat is “unclean.” Such accommodations do not directly depend on 
discriminatory views about the public that they are hired to serve. The 
personal characteristics of the public being served are not involved. Such 
accommodation merely entails adjustments to scheduling or presentation in 
the work environment. They impact all members of the public in the same 
way, if at all. They do not entail a denial of service to certain members of 
the public because of elements of their character (race, religion, gender, 
sexual orientation, and so on) that are constitutionally or statutorily 
guaranteed equal treatment.
There is a duty to accommodate a person to the point of undue 
hardship on the basis of whichever protected characteristic applies to that 
person. However, as was pointed out in Nichols, it is not the duty of a 
member of the public to accommodate a person acting for the government; 
rather it is the person acting on behalf of the government who must make 
the accommodation for the public whom he or she serves. McMurtry J. 
stated:
M.J. and other members of the public do not have to depend upon 
encountering a marriage commissioner who has no moral or religious 
objection to performing a same sex marriage in order to gain access to 
an entitlement to be married without discrimination. Regardless of the 
religious basis of Mr.  Nichols views, his acting on them in this manner 
constitutes discrimination in the provision of a public service on the basis 
of sexual orientation. Any accommodation of Mr. Nichols’ religious 
views, if the duty to accommodate exists, is not the responsibility of 
those who seek the services that he is legally empowered to provide. 
If any accommodation is due to Mr. Nichols for his religious views, it 
must be accomplished without risking what occurred here—where the 
complainant sought a service and was expressly denied it on the basis of 
his sexual orientation.57 
If the religious accommodation argument extended so as to affect the 
requirement to provide other services to all citizens, then the implications 
could be truly astonishing in some sectors such as health and education. 
There might result a patchwork of implementation of services dependent 
on the religious (and perhaps other) views of the persons hired to provide 
the services. If the argument is made that this counter-argument is alarmist 
57. Nichols, supra note 2 at para 57.
Religion-based Claims for Impinging on Queer Citizenship 151
and that such opt-outs would in practice affect only homosexuals (since 
they are the members of the group in today’s Canada most regularly 
affected by religion-based prejudice) then that argument only serves to 
highlight the need for the members of this group to have the protection of 
equality guaranteed under the Charter and human rights statutes. In fact, 
however, we suggest that, once allowed, such exceptions for a religious 
person from the application of the usual equality norms would grow in 
number and could make service management in some areas and on some 
matters extremely difficult.
(b) Refusal to allow an exception for a religious person from the 
application of the usual equality norms amounts to coercion by the 
state at the behest of “powerful” groups
This argument is closely related to the previous argument. It has two 
aspects to it: that the state is requiring religious people as a group to give 
up their views and that there are certain powerful groups (perhaps called 
“the elite” or some such term) that are behind this mandate.58 In both 
circumstances (a) and (b), this is seen as an attack on religion. In argument 
(a), just discussed, the concern was for the religious views and values of a 
given individual or institution. In the context of argument (b), the concern 
is for the position of religion writ-large in society. There is more than a 
suggestion that religion is under attack or being devalued in society.
This argument for religion writ-large has figured more prominently 
in Canadian cases involving equality rights for lesbians and gay men in 
recent years.59 The argument has aspects of a zero-sum approach to social 
value. An increase in provision and protection of equality for homosexuals 
necessarily entails a diminishment of value for religion and protection for 
religious views. Canadian courts have been fairly consistent at refusing 
to accept that religion is somehow diminished when other rights are 
protected—usually rights such as equality for women or lesbians and 
gay men, access to medical treatment for children, or freedom from hate 
speech.
In Big M Drug Mart, Dickson J. said: “The essence of the concept 
of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a 
person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without 
fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest belief by worship 
58. Trotter, supra note 36 at 372.
59. MacDougall, supra note 20. 
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and practice or by teaching and dissemination.”60 But he then added that 
the concept means more than that. “Freedom means that, subject to such 
limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one is to be 
forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.”61
In the context of educational and social services, access to employment, 
or to same-sex marriage, it is difficult to accept that “powerful” groups are 
conspiring to undermine religion. As noted earlier, the ability of religions 
to operate such services or to conduct marriages, for example, is fully 
preserved; even their ability to discriminate as to whom to provide that 
service to is protected in certain contexts.62 Some religions in Canada 
have constitutionally protected positions with respect to running their 
own publicly-funded schools.63 Concern for religious sensitivities is 
specifically addressed in legislation such as the Civil Marriage Act and the 
PEI Marriage Act.64
(c) Refusal to allow an exception for a religious person from the 
application of the usual equality norms fails to accommodate 
religious views held in good faith, namely that homosexuality or 
homosexual behaviour, or both, are immoral
There is a problem with accepting that certain public servants can refuse 
to provide government services they were hired to supply on the basis that 
they believe some members of the public or their behaviour are immoral 
(even though constitutionally guaranteed equality on the basis of those very 
characteristics). The problem is that this position injects those religious 
attitudes beyond the particular employee and into the government itself. 
This constitutes an extension of the religious views of a particular person in 
a manner which directly impacts on others. The fact that sexual orientation 
is constitutionally entitled to equality protection in the same way that race, 
60. R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at para 99, [1985] SCJ no 17. A useful discussion of 
the jurisprudence (up to the end of the last century) relating to religion interests in Canada is found in 
David M. Brown, “Freedom from or Freedom for? Religion as a Case Study in Defining the Context 
of Charter Rights” (2000), 33 UBC L Rev 551.
61. Ibid at para 95 [emphasis added]. See also Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15, [1996] 1 
SCR 825 at para 72, [1996] SCJ no 40, in which La Forest J said: “Indeed, this court has affirmed that 
freedom of religion ensures that every individual must be free to hold and to manifest without state 
interference those beliefs and opinions dictated by one’s conscience. This freedom is not unlimited, 
however, and is restricted by the right of others to hold and to manifest beliefs and opinions of their 
own, and to be free from injury from the exercise of the freedom of others. Freedom of religion is 
subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals and the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”
62. See e.g. Caldwell v Stuart, [1984] 2 SCR 603; TWU, supra note 13.
63. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 93, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, no 5.
64. Civil Marriage Act, supra note 3 at s 3.1; PEI Marriage Act, supra note 5 at s 11.1.
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sex, national origin and so on are entitled to protection should make it 
immune to any sort of argument based on morality. The government and its 
public servants ought not in any circumstances to be entitled to qualify its 
provision of equal services and entitlement based on morality arguments.65 
The government should not be permitted to, in a sense, privatize these 
basic constitutional values by delegating their implementation to standards 
set in accordance with the firmly-held (religious) views of its employees.
For example, allowing certain marriage commissioners to opt out of 
performing same-sex marriages casts such marriages, and indeed the very 
idea of equality on the basis of sexual orientation, as morally problematic. 
These matters ought not to be characterized by the courts or the government 
as moral issues at all, given their constitutionally protected status. To do 
otherwise makes such constitutional protection contingent in a way that 
contradicts the protection itself.66
In any event, a public servant is no more being required to participate 
in what he or she considers immoral homosexual activity by conducting 
a same-sex marriage than a gay marriage commissioner is being required 
to participate in heterosexual activity by officiating at an opposite-
sex ceremony. Similarly, a person offering a public service such as for 
example, printing a flyer for a hockey tournament is not implicated in 
espousing hockey.  The objections based on sexual orientation appear on 
closer examination to have more to do with distaste for homosexual status 
itself rather than any particular homosexual activity. And this basis for 
objection arguably even contradicts the distinction between homosexual 
status (acceptable, often) and homosexual activity (unacceptable, usually) 
that so many religions themselves claim to be so important.67
There is also the suggestion that the government or state is somehow 
impugning the good faith of the views held by the religious person.68 Given 
the accommodation that is given to religious persons and to religions in 
65. See also Moon, “Introduction”, supra note 10 at 9.
66. Therefore, we criticise statements such as those of Gonthier J, dissenting in Chamberlain, supra 
note 26 at para 150, where he stated: “The moral status of same-sex relationships is controversial: to 
say otherwise is to ignore the reality of competing beliefs which led to this case. This moral debate, 
however, is clearly distinct from the very clear proposition that no persons are to be discriminated 
against on the basis of sexual orientation. The appellants, using the courts, seek to make this 
controversial moral issue uncontroversial by saying that s. 15 and “Charter values” are required to 
eradicate moral beliefs, because the hypothesis is that possible future acts of discrimination are likely 
to emanate from such beliefs”. 
67. See Trotter, supra note 36 at 371, n 19, where Trotter argues that though Canadian law does not 
distinguish between homosexual behaviour and identity after Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 
DLR (4th) 609 [Egan], religious persons ought to be able to ignore that legal position because of their 
religious beliefs.
68. Trotter, ibid at 369.
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general, this is a difficult argument to accept. In fact, the government or 
state in no way questions the religious views of the person. The person is 
free to express those views and to engage in any religious activity itself 
outside the work or service context. These rights for a civil servant are 
not diminished in any way so long as the person is not using his or her 
government position as a means to a platform, as occurred in Kempling.69 
Just as the government is within its rights to forbid proselytizing at work 
or religious ceremonies in the workplace itself, it is right to prevent 
religious values from dictating what services will be available to which 
of its citizens.
Trotter objects to the assertion that some religious views are 
“homophobic” on the basis that “[n]o respectable religious organization 
advocates homophobia—that is, abuse of persons who engage in 
homosexual behaviour. At the same time, many respectable religious 
persons hold a good faith belief that homosexual behaviour is inconsistent 
with the nature or purpose of humankind, and that it should be avoided.”70 
It is not at all indisputable that beliefs (whether translated or not into a 
refusal to provide a service or employment to homosexuals) that denigrate 
or regard homosexuality, or homosexuals, or both, to be inferior can be 
called “homophobic.” Just as such beliefs about other races or about 
women (whether translated into action or not) that diminish those other 
races or women can be described as racist or misogynist, such beliefs 
about homosexuals and homosexuality are indeed homophobic. 
Another aspect of this good faith accommodation issue is the argument 
that it is inappropriate to distinguish religious belief and manifestation 
of religious belief. Trotter notes that Canadian law does not distinguish 
between behaviour and identity.71 Egan v. Canada effectively equates 
homosexual identity and homosexual behaviour for the purposes of 
s. 15 of the Charter.72 Importantly, however, the acceptance of homosexual 
behaviour in a context such as Egan (availability of benefits for a same-
sex couple) does not mean that the rights of others are simultaneously 
curtailed.
In Nichols, it was argued that a marriage commissioner ought to be 
permitted to refuse to perform a same-sex marriage for religious reasons.73 
In terms of Nichols’ argument that there was a violation of his s. 2(a) 
Charter rights, the Court accepted that there is a difference between belief 
69. Kempling, supra note 34.
70. Ibid  at 368-69.
71. Ibid. 
72. Egan, supra note 67.
73. Supra note 2.
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and conduct. The freedom to hold a belief is broader than a right to act 
upon it. The Court cited TWU74 and Big M Drug Mart.75 McMurtry J. 
stated at para. 73:
It seems to me that when Mr. Nichols acts as a marriage commissioner, 
his freedom of religion ought to be limited to exclude discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. I agree with the tribunal that Mr. Nichols, 
in his capacity as a marriage commissioner acting as government, is not 
entitled to discriminate, regardless of his private beliefs. Mr. Nichols was 
wrong to believe he could follow a private policy, not authorized by The 
Marriage Act, which had the effect of discriminating against M.J.76
The context in which a person seeks to manifest his or her religious belief 
is crucial. There are undoubtedly certain services that are in fact part of 
religious observance and these services will normally be offered to those 
who are members of a religious group. Thus, human rights legislation 
permits exceptions to discrimination on a particular basis, for example 
religion, where a service is in fact offered primarily to members of that 
group. A public service of the state will never fall into this category, 
but many private businesses will also fall outside this exception. Thus, 
in Brockie, it was held that a printing business could not refuse work 
producing stationery for the Canadian Lesbian and Gay Archives on the 
basis that the owner of the business held a belief that homosexual conduct 
was sinful and that his doing work for the Archives would implicate him 
in that sin.77 The Court held that performing work for the Archives was not 
core to the business owner’s freedom of religious belief.
Interestingly, some who present the religion claim dispute the ability 
to detach religious belief from practice deny this unity to sexual identity. 
Trotter argues, for instance, that: 
Many religions do make the behaviour/identity distinction, asserting a 
duty to love the person unconditionally even while opposing a particular 
behaviour. The court is not competent to ascribe to religious persons 
the law’s ‘belief’ that behaviour and identity are identical. That would 
be exactly the kind of breach of s. 2(a) [of the Charter] that it was 
entrenched to prevent.78 
Thus according to Trotter, a religious person should be accommodated 
so as to be able to detach sexual orientation behaviour (such as getting 
74. Supra note 13.
75. Supra note 60.
76. Supra note 2 at para 74.
77. Supra note 35.
78. Trotter, supra note 36.
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a same-sex marriage service) and sexual orientation identity. Strikingly, 
however, this is exactly the detachment that Trotter says is not permitted 
in the context of the religious person’s own belief in terms of translating 
those beliefs into behaviour/action that constitutes a denial of service or 
exclusion of gay or lesbian individuals. 
(d) Allowing an exception for a religious person from the application 
of the usual equality norms would not present an undue burden on 
queer people
The argument is made that allowing discrimination based on the religious 
values of those who offer services or who are employed to provide them 
does not unduly inconvenience queer people. Thus, same-sex couples are 
not unduly burdened by having some marriage commissioners refuse to 
serve them. Trotter contends that permitting marriage commissioners to 
refuse to perform same-sex marriages will at most involve “one or two” 
more phone calls on the part of the rejected gay or lesbian person in order 
to find somebody who will provide the service.79 This is an astonishing 
position in which to place gays and lesbians, and yet another example 
of the historical trend of disadvantaging queer people by denying them 
full citizenship in Canada as protected by the Charter and human rights 
legislation. It is true that any couple might be declined service because 
a particular marriage commissioner is booked or unavailable, but this is 
quite different from being refused because the marriage commissioner 
does not serve gay and lesbian people. Carl Stychin thinks that there 
might be reason to, at times, allow a marriage commissioner to refuse 
to conduct a service. He says a decision-maker ought to be required “to 
reflect on ... whether a minimal delay in getting a scheduled date for a 
marriage ceremony is a significant burden on a same-sex couple.”80 The 
impact on such citizens being refused service by public servants, or 
those who offer services to the public, and sent elsewhere to obtain this 
constitutionally or statutorily-guaranteed service cannot be minimized. 
Having to accept even one such refusal of service constitutes significant 
substantive (and even formal) inequality. The hurt and marginalization 
such refusal will create is magnified when the historical diminution of 
homosexuals and homosexuality is considered. The negative impact such 
a refusal of service can have was illustrated in one of the Saskatchewan 
marriage commissioner cases. The person denied the marriage service 
in that case was “devastated and crushed” and suffered “a lot of anxiety 
79. Supra note 36 at 377.
80. Supra note 47 at 752. See also Ryder, “Canadian Conception”, supra note 49, at 100-02.
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and sleepless nights” as a result of the refusal.81 Even in a city as queer-
friendly as Vancouver, it is thought necessary to publicize which marriage 
commissioners are “gay-friendly.”82 Would even the most ardent supporter 
of religious exceptionalism argue that it would be acceptable to create an 
environment where it was necessary to publicize which civil servants are 
“Sikh-friendly,” “woman-friendly,” “black-friendly” and so on? Trotter 
urges marriage commissioners to exercise their “right” to refuse service 
in “a respectful and sensitive manner” so as to “minimize” the “emotional 
pain” to the same-sex couple refused service and to “affirm” their “human 
dignity.”83
It has to be borne in mind here that in the marriage context these civil 
marriages are in most cases the only marriages that will be available to 
same-sex couples, given the unavailability of most religious marriages to 
them.84 Gays and lesbians will represent a disproportionate share of those 
asking for civil marriages as compared to the percentage of all couples 
getting married. Similarly, there is often not much choice in many areas 
where certain educational or social services are offered. In any event, 
even where there is a great deal of choice in terms of services offered, the 
exclusion of a member of a constitutionally protected group from access to 
the services offered to the public generally is never justified.
Furthermore, it is clear that in some geographical areas, if public 
servants or those who offer services to the public, are allowed to decide 
for themselves whether to offer such services, there may be few who will 
be willing to provide the service. There might be more than one or two 
phone calls that will need to be made. This is particularly injurious to the 
lesbian or gay person in those communities where they are already subject 
to discrimination and marginalization. In such areas, it may not only be 
those who hold strong personal religious views that will refuse to provide 
the services. Others may face strong pressure to refuse to provide such 
services or themselves face ostracism from their society. Allowing choice 
as to whether to provide a particular service or not, in fact, politicizes 
individual service positions. The refusal to allow an exception for a 
religious person from the application of the usual equality norms prevents 
such pressure in the first place.
81. Supra note 2 at para 15.
82. “Marriage Commissioners” online: GayVancouver.net <http://gayvancouver.net/marriage.
htm>.
83. Supra note 36 at 376, n 36.
84. As in Nichols, supra note 2 at para 12, in which the complainant was Roman Catholic and so 
could not have a religious marriage.
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(e) The number of people affected by allowing an exception for a 
religious person from the application of the usual equality norms 
would be small
This issue is related to the last one. It is based on the fallacy that denial 
of equality is somehow more acceptable the fewer the number of persons 
affected is. This is the notion that discrimination against two Jews is less 
egregious than discrimination against four. Trotter appears to think that the 
possibility of a same-sex couple’s being refused service is a hypothetical 
or “abstract” issue; yet, as mentioned earlier, there has already been 
one successful case brought against a marriage commissioner in such a 
situation.85
In Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, Sopinka J. 
said: 
[M]ore than minor inconvenience must be shown before the complainant’s 
right to accommodation can be defeated. The employer must establish 
that actual interference with the rights of other employees, which is not 
trivial but substantial, will result from the adoption of the accommodating 
measures. Minor interference or inconvenience is the price to be paid for 
religious freedom in a multicultural society. 86 
Trotter cites this as justification for the “minor inconvenience” that same-
sex couples will face when refused service by a marriage commissioner 
because of that person’s religious views. Renaud was, however, about 
the refusal to accommodate work shifts around an employee’s religious 
observance day. It is a situation that fits into the fifth scenario discussed in 
Part II of this paper. Such accommodation would indeed constitute a minor 
inconvenience to other employees. That is quite different from a refusal 
to provide a service to a member of the public on the basis of a protected 
characteristic.
The fact is that equality protection is most needed where numbers are 
small. This is true both on a national and a local level. With the exception 
of discrimination against women, where other historical factors come 
into play, discrimination against certain races, religions, disabilities and 
so on exists largely because of the minority status of members of certain 
groups. Once a critical number has been attained a group is better able to 
protect its interests politically. The smaller the group the less likely this 
is to occur. The possibility of historical hostility may also be a factor in 
85. Supra note 2.
86. Central Okanagan School District No 23 v Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970 at para 27, 95 DLR (4th) 
577.
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any case. Queer people have both history and numbers working against 
them. Numbers are kept even smaller by the invisibility of membership in 
many cases. It is exactly because of the small numbers that protection is 
needed.
Protection of equal rights in the context of dominant local hostility 
(often religiously generated) was a legitimate legal and governmental 
objective stressed by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
case of Chamberlain. At the local level, the reason why in some areas 
(probably the more conservative areas) the numbers of queer people 
are particularly small is that they are figuratively or literally driven out 
because of the particular hostility they face in those areas.  School boards 
rejecting lesbian and gay themed books, as in Chamberlain, is one device 
designed to exclude queers. The case of Chiang, also involving a public 
school, illustrates the dangers of exclusion if a critical number of persons 
with religious views hostile to homosexuality are allowed to bring those 
views into a school.
Trotter makes the case that “there are reasonable alternatives to a 
rule which compels all marriage commissioners to perform same-sex 
marriages. The most obvious alternative is the recruitment of further 
marriage commissioners who are willing to perform such marriages.”87 
The extraordinary nature of this claim to reasonableness is evident if 
“same-sex” is replaced by “mixed-race” or “lower caste.”88 Likewise, 
Trotter criticises the use of hypotheticals and notes that there have been 
very few actual refusals to perform same-sex marriage services. Thus, it 
would seem that there is no “real” problem that needs to be addressed. But 
again, if one employs analogies to a person who refused such services to 
members of certain racial groups, or religions or to women, it would seem 
extraordinary to argue that the paucity of actual cases of complaint means 
the problem is hypothetical and can simply be worked around.
Permitting the withholding of services to queer people is just another 
reason to make queer people feel unwelcome and perhaps even unsafe in a 
given area. It is in those areas that full provision of services is most needed 
and most valuable for those with a homosexual or other queer status. Such 
services must be provided in a way that is unqualified and un-begged for. 
In fact, the small numbers of queer people who will be asking for service 
or the small number of homosexual couples who will be seeking a same-
87. Supra note 36 at 368.
88. Note that apartheid in South Africa was justified on religious grounds: Saul Dubow, Scientific 
Racism in Modern South Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 258ff. The 
diminished role ascribed to women by many religions needs no citation.
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sex civil marriage in comparison with the numbers of opposite-sex couples 
militates in favour of a no opt-out policy, if the “minor inconvenience” 
point discussed above holds any weight. If it can be argued that the rights 
of gays and lesbians would be acceptably infringed because all they had to 
do was make “one or two” additional phone calls to find a public servant 
who would serve them, it might be similarly argued that most marriage 
commissioners would have to conduct only “one or two” same-sex 
marriage ceremonies a year in most communities—if that.
Conclusion
Canada’s sexual minorities (especially lesbians and gay men, less so 
transgendered and other queer persons) have benefited enormously 
from constitutional protection from unequal treatment by the state on 
the basis of sexual orientation, they have also benefited from protection 
from discrimination in the public sphere available under human rights 
legislation. The law has profoundly impacted the legal and social position 
of queer people in Canada as they strive to achieve full citizenship. But 
these improvements have not by any means eliminated the prevalence of 
prejudicial attitudes that seek to marginalize and denigrate minority sexual 
orientations by devices such as the denial of services or converting legal 
issues into moral controversies.89 
Vigilance is needed to prevent the equality gains of Canada’s queer 
citizens from being hollowed out under the guise of protecting the religious 
beliefs of those who provide government or other services in all areas of 
day-to-day life. Religious accommodation is desirable when it facilitates 
inclusion and does not entail exclusion for others. As such, it is important 
to accommodate religious practices where feasible in the workplace. It is 
not, however, acceptable to accommodate a claim to entitlement to refuse 
to serve, deal with or employ persons (because of their sexual orientation) 
for religious or any other reason. This latter situation constitutes a claim 
for exceptionalism and an ability to exclude others from the usual social 
and economic fabric. We argue that the goals of accommodation and 
inclusion are not served by accepting demands that the accommodation 
and inclusion of one can occur only on the basis that one is entitled to deny 
the ordinary provision of a service, employment and so on to another. A 
person ought not to be permitted to make his or her inclusion dependent 
on the exclusion of another. 
89. See Donn Short, “Am I Safe Here? Queers, Bullying and Safe Schools” (2007) 19:3/4 Journal 
of Gay & Lesbian Social Services 31; “Conversations in Equity and Social Justice: Constructing Safe 
Schools for Queer Youth” (2010) 8:2 J for Critical Education Pol’y Studies 329.
